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The Potholes of Offender-Funded Driving 
Diversion: How Minnesota’s Driving 
Diversion Program Fails the People It Is 
Supposed to Help 
Sammi Nachtigal† 
 
The burden of paying for the United States’ justice system has 
shifted from the collective responsibility of taxpayers to the people 
facing prosecution.1 States and municipalities hope to close revenue 
shortfalls resulting from tax cuts by increasing fines and fees for 
low-level offenses.2 Some states have enlisted for-profit companies 
to collect unpaid court fines and fees through pay-only probation, 
essentially creating criminal justice debt collectors.3 Minnesota has 
implemented a new model for criminal justice debt collection: pay-
only diversion. Minnesota legislators see pay-only diversion run by 
for-profit companies as a system where everyone wins: the program 
enrollee pays off criminal justice debts through an  payment plan, 
prosecutors reduce caseloads by funneling misdemeanor offenders 
into a diversion program, the for-profit business makes money, and 
the state saves money and collects outstanding fines and fees.4 But 
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 1. PETER EDELMAN, NOT A CRIME TO BE POOR: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF 
POVERTY IN AMERICA, at xv (2017) (originating in tax cuts in the Reagan era and the 
continued political expediency of reducing taxes, revenue gaps in state governments 
lead to criminal justice budget cuts and the shift of the cost to “the ‘users’ of the 
courts, including those least equipped to pay” through increased fees and fines). 
 2. Id. at xvi. 
 3. Neil L. Sobol, Fighting Fines & Fees: Borrowing from Consumer Law to 
Combat Criminal Justice Debt Abuses, 88 U. COLO. L. REV. 841, 858 (2017); CHRIS 
ALBIN-LACKEY, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PROFITING FROM PROBATION: AMERICA’S 
“OFFENDER-FUNDED” PROBATION INDUSTRY 1 (Arvind Ganesan et al. eds., 2014), ht
tps://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us0214_ForUpload_0.pdf. 
 4. See Driver’s License Reinstatement Diversion Pilot Program Created for 
Individuals Charged with Driving Without a Valid License: Hearing on H.F. 589 
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in reality, pay-only diversion greatly burdens program enrollees 
who are hit with hefty program fees, remain trapped in the criminal 
justice system, and rarely see any of the promised program benefits, 
such as license reinstatement.5 Furthermore, abusive collection 
tactics are rampant: private companies operate diversion programs 
with little to no state oversight. As a result, these programs 
prioritize profits above all else.6 
In Minnesota, the Driving Diversion Program (“DDP”) is 
designed to help people who have racked up exorbitant fines and 
fees for driving with revoked or suspended licenses.7 DDP, run by 
the for-profit probation company Diversion Solutions, LLC, is 
completely offender-funded, costing the state and participating 
counties and cities nothing.8 Minnesota legislators are now looking 
to expand DDP statewide.9 However, the pilot program’s success 
has been overstated.10 While the intentions behind DDP are good, 
the program falls short due to a lack of accountability and a 
mismatch between private incentives and public goals. 
Part I of this Note provides background on national trends in 
criminal justice, including the decriminalization of misdemeanors, 
increases in fines and fees in an offender-funded criminal justice 
system, privatized pay-only probation and diversion, and driver’s 
license suspension and revocation for non-driving-related behaviors 
 
Before the H. Public Safety Policy & Oversight Comm., 2009 Leg., 86th Sess. (Minn. 
2009) [hereinafter Oversight Committee Hearing] (statement of John Choi, Ramsey 
Cty. Att’y); Oversight Committee Hearing (statement of Kori Land, City Att’y for 
South St. Paul, West St. Paul, & Inver Grove Heights). 
 5. EDELMAN, supra note 1, at 11; Randy Furst, Data Shows Driver’s License 
Reinstatement Program Is Less Successful Than Company Claims, STAR TRIB. (May 
21, 2017), http://www.startribune.com/data-shows-driver-s-license-reinstatement-pr
ogram-is-less-successful-than-company-claims/423247683/. 
 6. Carl Takei, From Mass Incarceration to Mass Control, and Back Again: How 
Bipartisan Criminal Justice Reform May Lead to a For-Profit Nightmare, 20 U. PA. 
J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 125, 154 (2017). 
 7. SAINT PAUL CITY ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, DULUTH CITY ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, & 
MINNEAPOLIS CITY ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, 2017 LEGISLATIVE REPORT FOR LICENSE 
REINSTATEMENT DIVERSION PILOT PROGRAM PURSUANT TO LAWS OF MINNESOTA 
2009, CH. 59, ART. 3, § 4, at 4 (2017), https://www.leg.state.mn.us/docs/2017/mandat
ed/170267.pdf [hereinafter 2017 Legislative Report]. 
 8. Oversight Committee Hearing, supra note 4 (statement of John Choi, Ramsey 
Cty. Att’y). 
 9. Bill Salisbury, Unpaid Traffic Tickets—Debt Trap for the Poor—in MN 
Legislators’ Sights, PIONEER PRESS (Mar. 31, 2017), http://www.twincities.com/2017
/03/31/mn-legislature-unpaid-traffic-tickets-debt-trap/. 
 10. Furst, supra note 5. 
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and offenses. Part II analyzes DDP’s originating legislation, 
program creation, and its operation. Part III examines DDP’s 
problems and abuses and argues that these abuses stem from the 
mismatch between private incentives and public goals and a lack of 
accountability and oversight. Part III also provides 
recommendations to the Minnesota Legislature and suggests better 
methods to reduce citations for driving without a valid license and 
accountability provisions that should be enacted if DDP becomes 
permanent and statewide as intended. 
I. Background on National Trends 
Minnesota’s Driving Diversion Program was born from a series 
of trends in state criminal justice systems: the decriminalization of 
misdemeanors, the shift to an offender-funded system, the use of 
pay-only probation outsourced to for-profit companies, and the use 
of driver’s license suspension as a civil penalty.11 These trends have 
had unintended consequences that harm the United States’ poorest 
populations. 
A. Decriminalizing Misdemeanors 
Constituting 80% of state court dockets, misdemeanor offenses 
have grown at significant rates.12 One reason for the growth is the 
net-widening effect that results from decriminalizing 
misdemeanors.13 In dealing with low-level offenders, courts have 
moved away from imprisonment toward greater reliance on fines 
and probation.14 States see decriminalization as an opportunity for 
“immense savings in the costs of prosecution, incarceration, and 
 
 11. 2017 Legislative Report, supra note 7, at 4–5; EDELMAN, supra note 1; Sobol, 
supra note 3. 
 12. America's Massive Misdemeanor System Deepens Inequality, EQUAL JUST. 
INITIATIVE (Jan. 9, 2019), https://eji.org/news/americas-massive-misdemeanor-syste
m-deepens-inequality. 
 13. Sobol, supra note 3, at 859–60. See also Issa Kohler-Hausmann,  
Managerial Justice and Mass Misdemeanors, 66 STAN. L. REV. 611, 630 (2014) 
(studying increases in misdemeanor arrests in New York City and finding that the 
number of misdemeanor arrests almost doubled between 1993 and 2010); Jenny 
Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy in the Lower 
Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277, 281 (2011) (citing a study that found the 
volume of misdemeanor cases nationwide rose from five to more than ten million 
between 1972 and 2006). 
 14. Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decriminalization, 68 VAND. L. REV. 
1055, 1059 (2015); Sobol, supra note 3, at 860. 
 
446 Law & Inequality [Vol. 37: 2 
 
defense counsel.”15 Decriminalization of misdemeanors provides 
courts with flexibility to require probation and/or payment of a fine 
when sentencing low-level offenders in cases where jail time seems 
like an excessive response.16 However, misdemeanor 
decriminalization17 has created “a more streamlined process and 
provid[es] fewer procedural protections than jailable offenses,” 
including the right to counsel.18 As a result, “decriminalization has 
led to a net-widening effect as municipalities have expanded 
coverage and imposed” fines and fees on more people.19 
Decriminalizing misdemeanors into fine-only offenses may help 
individuals who can afford the fines or fees escape the criminal 
justice system and avoid incarceration.20 Some offenders may 
benefit if they are able to attend incarceration-alternative 
treatment programs.21 This approach, however, leaves indigent 
defendants ensnared in the system in an unending debt trap.22 
B. The Shift to an Offender-Funded Criminal Justice 
System Through Ballooning Fines and Fees 
Decades of tax cuts have left local governments scrambling to 
cut spending and find alternative forms of revenue.23 Many states 
and municipalities have turned to fines and fees in order to fund 
 
 15. Natapoff, supra note 14, at 1072. 
 16. ALBIN-LACKEY, supra note 3, at 12. 
 17. Natapoff, supra note 14, at 1057 (“[I]n the misdemeanor context 
‘decriminalization’ does not mean ‘legalization’ . . . it typically reduces penalties, 
mainly incarceration, for conduct that remains illegal and forbidden.”). 
 18. Sobol, supra note 3, at 858. 
 19. Sobol, supra note 3, at 858; Natapoff, supra note 14, at 1055 (adding that the 
shift to probation and fines for misdemeanor offenses has had distributive 
implications: poor and disadvantaged defendants, for whom fines and supervision 
are especially burdensome, get caught in a cycle of never-ending criminal justice 
debt, supervision, and possibly jail while well-resourced offenders are permitted to 
exit the process with relative ease). 
 20. Sobol, supra note 3, at 877. 
 21. Sobol, supra note 3, at 877. 
 22. Sobol, supra note 3, at 877. 
 23. Edelman, supra note 1, at xv; Sobol, supra note 3, at 859. See U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT 
2–3 (2015), https://perma.cc/2BK4-5AC2 (reporting findings from the investigation 
of the Ferguson Police Department following the fatal shooting Michael Brown (an 
unarmed black teenager) that showed there was a focus on generating revenue in 
police practices and that “the court primarily use[s] its judicial authority as the 
means to compel the payment of fines and fees that advance the City’s financial 
interests.”). 
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their criminal justice systems.24 Some cities “incentivized by their 
own budget goals and shortfalls, encourage local police to increase 
the number of citations in order to drive up revenue,” with 
municipal courts acting as the “mechanism for collection.”25 In the 
U.S. over ten million individuals are estimated to have criminal 
justice debt, over $50 billion and growing.26 When defendants 
cannot pay their criminal justice debt,27 they may face more fines, 
fees, extended probation, civil penalties (such as driver license 
suspension), or jail.28 
In 1983, the Supreme Court held that it is unconstitutional to 
jail an indigent person for failure to pay a fine if that person made 
“sufficient bona fide efforts to acquire the resources to do so”29 and 
that “the court must consider alternative measures of punishment 
other than imprisonment.”30 Despite this ruling, people in many 
states who cannot pay off their accumulating criminal justice debt 
often find themselves jailed for low-level, fine-only offenses for no 
reason other than nonpayment of those fines and court costs.31 
Fortunately, in Minnesota, arrest warrants are not issued for 
failure to pay fines; however, failure to pay can result in license 
suspension.32 
 
 24. Natapoff, supra note 14, at 14. 
 25. Whitney Benns & Blake Strode, Debtors’ Prison in 21st-Century America, 
ATLANTIC (Feb. 23, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/02/de
btors-prison/462378/. 
 26. Sobol, supra note 3, at 855. 
 27. Criminal justice debt refers to the amassing of fees and fines from all stages 
of the criminal process including pre-conviction, sentencing, incarceration, and post-
release supervision. Sobol, supra note 3, at 841–42; Lauren-Brooke Eisen & Jessica 
Eaglin, Poverty, Incarceration, and Criminal Justice Debt, TALK POVERTY (Dec. 2, 
2014), https://talkpoverty.org/2014/12/02/criminal-justice-debt/. 
 28. Eisen & Eaglin, supra note 27. 
 29. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 672 (1983). 
 30. Id. at 661 (adding that the state is justified in using imprisonment as a 
sanction to enforce collection when a probationer who has the means to pay willfully 
refuses to pay a fine or restitution). 
 31. See Torie Atkinson, Note, A Fine Scheme: How Municipal Fines Become 
Crushing Debt in the Shadow of the New Debtors’ Prisons, 51 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
189, 217–25 (2016) (adding that criminal justice debt has some of the same effects as 
consumer credit debt, including: “poor credit, feelings of shame and emotional 
distress, and an increased risk of losing transportation, housing, work, and good 
health” in addition to state actions that may include “license suspension, loss of 
community services and government benefits,” and potentially the issuance of arrest 
warrants). 
 32. 2017 Legislative Report, supra note 7, at 4. 
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C. Privatizing Criminal Justice Debt Collection 
When the criminal justice system becomes a source of revenue, 
extraction of that revenue is an important goal of the criminal 
process.33 To eliminate operation costs entirely, municipalities and 
states privatize criminal justice debt collection, which allows for-
profit companies to collect debt free of cost to the taxpayers by 
passing off the hefty price to the offender.34 Pay-only probation is 
used for low-level offenders who face fines and fees totaling an 
amount beyond their ability to pay immediately.35 Offenders who 
can pay off their fines and fees entirely are able to close the cases 
against them and avoid supervision.36 Offenders who cannot pay 
their fines and court costs are sentenced to probation where the sole 
substantive condition is making regular and timely payments as 
part of a long-term payment plan.37 Probation officers do not 
supervise such offenders; instead, they “collect money, and . . . use 
the credible threat of incarceration to coerce offenders into paying 
down their fines along with their probation fees.”38 Offender-funded 
pay-only probation, often contracted out to for-profit private 
probation companies, means that in addition to paying off their 
criminal justice debt, probationers are required to “pay for the 
‘privilege’ of being put on probation” by way of supervision fees.39 
When municipalities outsource pay-only probation to private, for-
profit companies, the companies operate with little oversight and 
“often employ aggressive intimidation tactics to coerce 
repayment.”40 
Privatized diversion has emerged as a new revenue-generation 
and debt-collection tactic.41 Diversion differs significantly from 
 
 33. Natapoff, supra note 14, at 1100. 
Natapoff, supra note 14, at 1100. 
 35. ALBIN-LACKEY, supra note 3, at 25–26. 
 36. ALBIN-LACKEY, supra note 3, at 25. 
 37. ALBIN-LACKEY, supra note 3, at 26. 
 38. ALBIN-LACKEY, supra note 3, at 26; Neil Sobol, Charging the Poor: Criminal 
Justice Debt and Modern Day Debtor’s Prisons, 75 MD. L. REV. 486, 518–19 (2016) 
(“Defendants unable to pay fines upfront are subject to additional fees and remain 
in the system, even though they pose no threat to society and their underlying 
offenses, such as traffic violations, typically do not require incarceration.”). 
 39. ALBIN-LACKEY, supra note 3, at 26. 
 40. Atkinson, supra note 31, at 206. 
 41. Shaila Dewan & Andrew W. Lehren, After a Crime, the Price of a Second 
Chance, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/12/us/crime-
criminal-justice-reform-diversion.html. 
 
2019] The Potholes of Offender-Funded Driving Diversion 449 
 
probation. Probation is the “suspension of sentence by the court,” 
meaning an offender on probation will remain in the community 
through the duration of the sentence, unless that offender engages 
in conduct that violates the conditions of probation, in which case 
the sentence would be carried out.42 Probation typically is imposed 
after a finding of guilt.43 Diversion, though, happens beforehand 
and instead of suspending a jail sentence, suspends criminal 
prosecution of the offense “subject to the defendant’s consent to 
treatment, rehabilitation, restitution, or other noncriminal or 
nonpunitive alternatives.”44 Diversion is meant “to relieve 
overburdened courts and crowded jails, and to spare low-risk 
offenders from the devastating consequences of a criminal record.”45 
In many jurisdictions, however, it has become a source of revenue 
collection.46 Diversion is typically privatized and offender-funded; 
therefore, it may come at a cost that is out of reach for many low-
income offenders.47 As a result, some low-income offenders do not 
get the option of diversion or are terminated from diversion for 
failure to pay and then subjected to the original charge.48 
D. Withdrawing Driving Privileges for Social Non-
Conformance Offenses 
Each year across the United States, an increasing number of 
drivers are suspended or revoked for non-driving related reasons 
following “significant increase[s] in legislated social non-
conformance suspensions.”49 Social non-conformance suspensions 
 
 42. Lewis Diana, What Is Probation?, 51 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE 
SCI. 189, 190 (1960). 
 43. Daniel E. Feld, Annotation, State Court’s Power to Place Defendant on 
Probation Without Imposition of Sentence, 56 A.L.R. 3d 932, § 2[a] at 935 (1974). 
 44. Debra T. Landis, Pretrial Diversion: Statute or Court Rule Authorizing 
Suspension or Dismissal of Criminal Prosecution on Defendant’s Consent to 
Noncriminal Alternative, 4 A.L.R. 4th 147, 1[a] at 150 (1981) (“Pretrial diversionary 
programs are premised on the belief that it is not always necessary, and in fact, may 
often be detrimental, to pursue formal courtroom prosecution for every criminal 
violation.”). 
 45. See Dewan & Lehren, supra note 41. 
 46. See Dewan & Lehren, supra note 41. 
 47. See Dewan & Lehren, supra note 41. (“Some prosecutors said fees were 
necessary to cover programs’ costs. In other cases, defendants were used as piggy 
banks.”). 
 48. See Dewan & Lehren, supra note 41. 
 49. Suspended/Revoked Working Group, Best Practices Guide to Reducing 
Suspended Drivers, AM. ASS’N MOTOR VEHICLE ADMINS., 5 (Feb. 2013), https://www
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“have no relationship to an individual’s ability to drive, their 
moving violation history, or any other factors related to the 
operation of a motor vehicle.”50 The rationale behind social non-
conformance suspensions is that it “provides effective, sustainable 
motivation to encourage individuals to comply with court ordered or 
legislated mandates to avoid suspension”; however, this lacks 
empirical support.51 When people lose driving privileges for non-
driving related reasons, evidence suggest that those people take the 
suspension less seriously.52 At least 75% of people who have had 
their driving privileges withdrawn continue to drive.53 Penalizing 
social non-conformance through license suspension and revocation 
creates significant burdens on courts, prosecutors, motor vehicle 
agencies, and law enforcement.54 Additionally, such penalties 
“require[] the driver licensing authority to operate outside of their 
core mission of ensuring highway safety.”55 
License suspensions disproportionately affect low-income 
communities, especially low-income communities of color.56 First, 
when failure to pay a traffic fine results in license suspension, “poor 
people get their licenses suspended much more often than those 
with means, as they don’t have the cash to pay.”57 These penalties 
make “driver’s licensing about whether you can pay a fine based on 
middle-class incomes, not because of how well you drive.”58 The 
issue is compounded for low-income people of color who are pulled 
over by law enforcement more often than are Whites.59 
 
.aamva.org/workarea/downloadasset.aspx?id=3723 [hereinafter AAMVA]. 
 50. Id. 
  
 52. Joseph Shapiro, Can’t Pay Your Fines? Your License Could Be Taken, NPR 
(Dec. 29, 2014), https://www.npr.org/2014/12/29/372691960/cant-pay-your-fines-you
r-license-could-be-taken. 
 53. Id. 
 54. 2017 Legislative Report, supra note 7, at 4; AAMVA, supra note 49, at 12. 
 55. AAMVA, supra note 49, at 22. 
 56. Joshua Aiken, Reinstating Common Sense: How Driver’s License Suspensions 
for Drug Offenses Unrelated to Driving Are Falling out of Favor, PRISON POL’Y 
INITIATIVE (Dec. 12, 2016), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/driving/national.html; 
Alana Semuels, No Driver’s License, No Job, ATLANTIC (Jul. 15, 2016), https://www.
theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/06/no-drivers-license-no-job/486653/. 
 57. Semules, supra note 56. 
 58. Semules, supra note 56 (quoting Nichole Yunk-Todd). 
 59. Elizabeth Davis et al., Contacts Between Police and the Public, 2015, OFFICE 
OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS 4 (Oct. 2018), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpp15.pdf; 
David Montgomery, Data Dive: Racial Disparities in Minnesota Traffic Stops, 
PIONEER PRESS (Jul. 8, 2016), https://www.twincities.com/2016/07/08/data-dive-raci
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Those who lose their driving privileges face many adverse 
employment effects.60 New Jersey’s Motor Vehicles Affordability 
and Fairness Task Force conducted a study on the impact of non-
driving related license suspensions.61 The Task Force discovered 
that license suspensions negatively affected respondents across all 
income levels and age groups: 42% reported job loss after 
suspension, 45% reported an inability to find employment after 
suspension, and 58% stated that suspension negatively impacted 
job performance.62 Low-income drivers fared far worse.63 Among 
low-income respondents, the Task Force found that 64% were not 
able to keep a job after suspension; 51% reported an inability to find 
employment after suspension; and 66% indicated that the 
suspension negatively affected job performance.64 Additionally, 
among low-income respondents, 65% indicated that they were 
unable to pay increased insurance costs; 64% experienced other 
costs related to suspension; and 90% of those who experienced other 
costs were not able to pay those costs.65 Many unlicensed drivers 
continue to drive which can lead to longer suspensions and more 
fines and fees.66 Without a valid license—a requirement for many 
jobs—people struggle to find well-paying jobs or maintain 
employment without reliable transportation.67 As a result, low-
income, unlicensed drivers often become trapped in this cycle.68 
II. Overview of Minnesota’s Driving Diversion Program 
After recognizing the cyclical problems low-income, unlicensed 
drivers in Minnesota were facing, the State Legislature created a 




 60. Semules, supra note 56. 
 61. See ALAN M. VOORHEES ET AL., MOTOR VEHICLES AFFORDABILITY & FAIRNESS 
TASK FORCE: FINAL REPORT (2006), https://dspace.njstatelib.org/xmlui/bitstream/h
andle/10929/21212/a9392006a.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y. 
 62. Id. at 38. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. See Oversight Committee Hearing, supra note 4 (statement of Kori Land, City 
Att’y for South St. Paul, West St. Paul, and Inver Grove Heights); Shapiro, supra 
note 52. 
 67. 2017 Legislative Report, supra note 7, at 8. 
 68. Oversight Committee Hearing, supra note 4 (statement of Kori Land). 
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A. Minnesota’s Unlicensed Drivers Problem 
In Minnesota, an estimated 700,000 people are driving after 
the state has withdrawn their driving privileges.69 While many 
drivers are suspended or revoked for driving-related offenses (such 
as driving under the influence, careless or reckless driving, or 
repetitive speeding),70 many have lost driving privileges for social 
non-conformance offenses including suspensions for failing to pay 
child support, failing to appear in court, or failing to pay a traffic 
fine or parking ticket.71 Though an initial violation may not carry 
potential jail time, if the driver fails to pay the fine, gets suspended 
as a result of nonpayment, and continues to drive after the 
suspension, they may face up to 90 days in jail, a $1,000 fine, or 
both in addition to a reinstatement fee and a longer suspension.72 
Driving after suspension (“DAS”) or driving after revocation 
(“DAR”)73 are payable misdemeanor offenses,74 meaning they “can 
be disposed of by paying a fine rather than appearing in court.”75 
Payment of a fine constitutes a guilty plea.76 Upon pleading guilty 
to DAS or DAR—either by paying fines out of court or appearing in 
court—defendants face the additional consequence of further 
license suspension.77 This creates a “revolving door” for many 
offenders.78 After paying the fines and fees of the first offense, the 
license is further suspended; therefore, if the re-suspended person 
continues to drive they risk more misdemeanor charges and more 
fines and fees.79 Many drivers with suspended or revoked licenses 
struggle to get reinstated because they have substantial 
 
 69. 2017 Legislative Report, supra note 7, at 4. 
 70. MINN. STAT. § 171.18. 
 71. See 2017 Legislative Report, supra note 7, at 5; AAMVA, supra note 49, at 
12. 
 72. See 2017 Legislative Report, supra note 7, at 4. 
 73. MINN. STAT. § 171.24 Subd. 1–4. 
 74. 2017 State Payable List Traffic/Criminal, MINN. JUD. BRANCH (2017) http://
mncourts.gov/mncourtsgov/media/scao_library/Statewide%20Payables/2017-Traffic-
Criminal-Payables-Lists.pdf. 
 75. Max A. Keller, “Payable” Offenses, BENCH & B. MINN. (Oct. 15, 2012), http://
mnbenchbar.com/2012/10/payable-offenses/. 
 76. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 23.03 subd. 3. 
 77. MINN. R. 7409.2200, subpart 4. 
 78. Oversight Committee Hearing, supra note 4 (statement of Kori Land). 
 79. Oversight Committee Hearing, supra note 4 (statement of Kori Land) (“[I]f 
they simply pay the citation; they get suspended again. And they continue to drive 
because they continue to need to get to work, or get to pick up the kids, or get 
groceries.”). 
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outstanding fines and fees, payment of which is required for 
reinstatement.80 
B. The Legislature’s Solution: The Driving Diversion 
Program 
Minnesota created the DDP to help people who have 
suspended driving privileges by allowing them to drive while they 
pay off their criminal justice debt over a period of time.81 The 
legislature recognized that license suspension dramatically affects 
low-income drivers who cannot afford to stop driving, particularly 
those of color.82 Diversion Solutions reported that Black 
participants make up 54% of DDP’s participants compared to 33% 
White participants, and 6% Hispanic.83 According to the U.S. 
Census Bureau, Minnesota’s racial demographics are 
approximately 85% White, 6.2% Black, and 5.2% Hispanic.84 
In 2009, the Minnesota Legislature created the license 
reinstatement pilot program for a few selected cities.85 Subsequent 
legislation extended the program in 2010, 2011, and 2013.86 
Pursuant to the law, participating cities “may establish a license 
reinstatement diversion pilot program” in which drivers charged 
with DAS or DAR who have not yet pleaded guilty may be issued a 
“diversion driver’s license” while participating in the diversion 
program and after paying a license reinstatement fee.87 Program 
participants are required to “(1) successfully attend and complete, 
at the individual’s expense, educational classes that 
provide . . . information on drivers’ licensure; (2) pay . . . all 
required fees, fines, and charges . . .; (3) comply with all traffic laws; 
and (4) demonstrate compliance with vehicle insurance 
 
 80. 2017 Legislative Report, supra note 7, at 8. 
 81. 2017 Legislative Report, supra note 7, at 4–5. 
 82. See Salisbury, supra note 9. 
 83. According to Scott Adkisson, Diversion Solutions CEO, these percentages are 
from class instructors visually surveying the participants attending the DDP class. 
Telephone Interview with Scott Adkisson, CEO, Diversion Solutions, LLC (Jan. 2, 
2018). 
 84. QuickFacts: Minnesota, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quick
facts/MN (last visited Feb. 14, 2019). 
 85. License Reinstatement Diversion Pilot Program, 2009 Minn. Laws, ch. 59 
art. 3 § 4. 
 86. 2017 Legislative Report, supra note 7, at 4. 
 87. License Reinstatement Diversion Pilot Program, 2009 Minn. Laws, ch. 59 
art. 3 § 4. 
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requirements.”88 The statute also states that a participant’s 
enrollment in the diversion program may terminate if the program’s 
“third-party administrator” finds that the individual is “no longer 
satisfying the conditions of the diversion. . .[or]. . .is guilty of a 
moving traffic violation or failure to provide vehicle insurance.”89 
The statute requires a biennial report from “the commissioner 
of public safety and each eligible city that participates in the 
diversion program . . . concerning the results of the program.”90 The 
report must contain the following information: (1) recidivism rates; 
(2) the number of unlicensed drivers continuing to drive; (3) the 
amounts cities, counties, and the state have collected through the 
payment of fees and fines; (4) educational support the program 
provides participants; (5) the program’s total number of 
participants and the number of participants that have been 
terminated; and (6) recommendations for necessary legislative 
changes.91 
Diversion Solutions, LLC (“Diversion Solutions”) developed 
and administers DDP and has been the only company to contract 
with participating cities and counties during the pilot program.92 
The legislation allows participating cities or counties to contract 
with other third-party administrators, but Diversion Solutions is 
the primary vendor in the market.93 A driver with a DAS or DAR 
citation may hear about the program from the officer who gave them 
the citation, from the prosecutor at their first court appearance, or 
from a non-profit support group.94 When a driver contacts Diversion 
Solutions to request admission into the program, Diversion 
Solutions consults with Minnesota’s Department of Public Safety, 
the Department of Vehicle Services, and the prosecutor to 
determine whether the driver is eligible to participate.95 
Participants must attend a class on driving laws and the program’s 
 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. 2017 Legislative Report, supra note 7, at 6, 19. 
 93. Furst, supra note 5. 
 94. 2017 Legislative Report, supra note 7, at 6. 
 95. Drivers are ineligible to participate in DDP for numerous reasons including 
if they have outstanding warrants, owe child support, have a “revoked” license status 
due to a DWI offense, have an invalid license in another state, and if they do not 
have an open citation in a participating city or county. 2017 Legislative Report, supra 
note 7, at 6, 9. 
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requirements.96 Participants must also provide proof of valid 
insurance, pay a license reinstatement fee, and take a written and 
driving test to receive a valid driver’s license.97 From that point on, 
as long as the participant remains in good standing with the DDP, 
a notation will appear in the participant’s driving record alerting 
law enforcement “that the individual is a ‘Participant in Diversion 
Pilot Program’ and thus subject to all of the conditions of the DDP 
and Minnesota Laws.”98 Diversion Solutions creates a payment 
plan, lasting no longer than eighteen months, for each participant.99 
This payment plan includes Diversion Solutions’ $350 service fee.100 
The statute states that “the original charge against the 
individual . . . may be reinstated against an individual whose 
participation in the diversion program terminates” for failure to 
“satisfy[] the conditions of the diversion.”101 One of the conditions of 
diversion is to make payments according to the payment plan 
designed by Diversion Solutions.102 Therefore, if a DDP participant 
is unable to keep up on monthly payments, that participant faces 
the re-withdrawal of their license and is subject to the original DAS 
or DAR charge with a potential sentence of up to a $1,000 fine and 
90 days in jail. 
III. Analysis of DDP’s Privatized Pay-Only Diversion Model 
and How That Model Leads to Abuses 
For-profit, pay-only diversion is a flawed model that puts 
profits and cutting costs above quality performance. The public goal 
behind DDP—reducing the number of unlicensed drivers on the 
road103—does not fit with how the third-party, for-profit company is 
incentivized, therefore leading to poor quality of service, unmet 
promises, and abusive practices. 
Holding offenders accountable is a top priority, but Diversion 
Solutions and other for-profit diversion companies should also be 
held accountable. The Minnesota legislature could enact several 
 
 96. 2017 Legislative Report, supra note 7, at 6, 9. 
 97. 2017 Legislative Report, supra note 7, at 6, 9. 
 98. 2017 Legislative Report, supra note 7, at 6, 9. 
 99. 2017 Legislative Report, supra note 7, at 6. 
 100. 2017 Legislative Report, supra note 7, at 6. 
 101. License Reinstatement Diversion Pilot Program, 2009 Minn. Laws, ch. 59 
art. 3 § 4. 
 102. 2017 Legislative Report, supra note 7, at 6. 
 103. License Reinstatement Diversion Pilot Program, 2009 Minn. Laws, ch. 59 
art. 3 § 4. 
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accountability measures that may help reduce DDP’s third-party 
administrator abuses. Additionally, alternative solutions for 
reducing the number of people driving on revoked or suspended 
licenses exist and should be explored. 
A. DDP Is Privatized, Pay-Only Diversion 
DDP is a type of pay-only diversion program. Failure to comply 
with the conditions of DDP, including the failure to make payments, 
maintain valid car insurance, or attend a class, does not 
immediately result in the issuance of an arrest warrant—a possible 
result for a probation violation—however, terminated DDP 
participants lose their driving privileges again and face the original 
DAS or DAR charge.104 DDP allows counties and municipalities to 
push thousands of low-level offenders out of the courtroom and into 
the hands of for-profit companies.105 
DDP is completely offender-funded and gives private 
companies unregulated power to determine how and how much 
offenders pay for their service.106 Currently, participants enrolled 
in DDP pay Diversion Solutions $350 as part of their payment plan, 
though the statute sets no limit on how much third-party 
administrators can charge offenders for their services.107 The 
statute also grants third-party administrators the power to 
determine what fees are to be paid, whether third-party 
administrators can charge additional fees for late payments, and 
whether third-party administrators can increase fees for 
participants with longer payment plans.108 Diversion Solutions 
collects this program fee first once participants begin making 
payments according to their payment plan.109 According to 
Diversion Solutions’ CEO Scott Adkisson, neither DPS, the 
prosecutor, nor Diversion Solutions have an evaluation process to 
determine whether an offender can afford to pay before a 
 
 104. Id. 
 105. 2017 Legislative Report, supra note 7, at 6. 
 106. License Reinstatement Diversion Pilot Program, 2009 Minn. Laws, ch. 59 
art. 3 § 4; 2017 Legislative Report, supra note 7, at 8. 
 107. License Reinstatement Diversion Pilot Program, 2009 Minn. Laws., ch. 59 
art. 3 § 4. 
 108. 2017 Legislative Report, supra note 7, at 8. 
 109. Payment of the reinstatement fee must be made upfront, but it is typically 
paid directly to DPS. License Reinstatement Diversion Pilot Program, 2009 Minn. 
Laws, ch. 59 art. 3 § 4; Interview with Scott Adkisson, supra note 83. 
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participant is admitted into the program.110 Without a pre-
admittance financial evaluation, some participants are admitted 
even though they are unlikely to complete the program because of 
a lack of financial resources or stable income. Once admitted, these 
participants face termination for failure to pay after a few months 
of making payments. 
Compounding the issue, the first monthly payments all go 
toward Diversion Solutions’ $350 program fee rather than towards 
participants’ criminal justice debt.111 For example, if a person who 
owes $1,000 in unpaid fines and fees begins making $100 monthly 
payments but fails to continue making scheduled payments after 
the first five months, the participant will still owe $850 in criminal 
justice debt though they have paid $500 while in DDP. Diversion 
Solutions is incentivized to enroll as many participants as possible 
even if a participant likely will not be able to complete diversion—
either from failing to make consistent payments or their inability to 
get insurance—because Diversion Solutions’ revenue depends on its 
ability to collect money from participants. Without increased 
accountability, oversight, and a removal of the profit-incentivizing 
framework, DDP—whether run by Diversion Solutions or a 
different third-party administrator—will have an incentive to put 
profits over quality performance, and participants will be the ones 
who pay. 
B.  DDP’s Problems and Abuses 
Diversion Solutions, no stranger to abusive collection 
tactics,112 violates DDP’s enabling legislation by accepting 
payments prior to a participant’s proof of insurance, keeping 
participants enrolled despite disqualifying moving violations, 
misrepresenting DDP’s success, and failing to provide an adequate 
educational component.113 The aim of the program was to end the 
 
 110. Interview with Scott Adkisson, supra note 83. 
 111. Interview with Scott Adkisson, supra note 83. 
 112. See Randy Furst, Diversion Firm Owner Chosen by County Attorney 
Associated with Past Sanctions, STAR TRIB. (Apr. 21, 2017), http://www.startribune.
com/diversion-firm-owner-chosen-by-county-attorney-associated-with-past-sanction
s/420095933/ (“[C]ompanies Adkisson has been involved in were sanctioned by the state 
Department of Commerce and Attorney General for operating without a license and 
misrepresenting themselves as law enforcement or a prosecutor while improperly 
collecting fees.”). 
 113. License Reinstatement Diversion Pilot Program, 2009 Minn. Laws, ch. 59 
art. 3 § 4. 
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“revolving door”114 and shut down a system that criminalized 
poverty.115 In reality, the revolving door is stuck shut, trapping poor 
offenders in a program that does not deliver on its promises. 
i. Accepting payments from uninsured individuals 
One of the most serious abuses Diversion Solutions engages in 
is accepting payment from participants prior to receiving proof of 
insurance.116 It is a requirement that all participants acquire 
insurance to participate in the program.117 Many participants are 
low-income,118 and experience difficulty finding auto insurance that 
they can afford.119 Participants in DDP cannot acquire a valid 
license status without that insurance, yet Diversion Solutions 
reportedly accepts payments from uninsured individuals who 
should not be in the program.120 As a private company, Diversion 
Solutions is solely motivated by profits—they cannot make money 
unless they get people into the program and on a payment plan—
therefore, the company has no incentive to terminate drivers from 
the program upon finding that they are not insured. Abuse of the 
insurance requirement is foreseeable when DDP’s third-party 
administrator operates without oversight. 
ii. Not terminating participants who commit subsequent 
moving violations 
DDP’s enabling legislation states that a participant who “is 
guilty of a moving traffic violation” will be terminated from DDP.121 
When asked in a phone interview what happens if someone enrolled 
in the program gets a speeding ticket, Scott Adkisson, Diversion 
Solution’s CEO, said that he tells participants that if they get a 
traffic ticket to go pay it—they will not be terminated from the 
 
 114. Oversight Committee Hearing, supra note 4 (statement of Kori Land). 
 115. Hearing on H.F. 1670 Before the Pub. Safety and Sec. Policy and Fin. Comm., 
2017 Leg., 90th Sess. (Minn. 2017) (statement of Rep. Zerwas). 
 116. Furst, supra note 5. 
 117. License Reinstatement Diversion Pilot Program, 2009 Minn. Laws, ch. 59 
art. 3 § 4. 
 118. 2017 Legislative Report, supra note 7, at 8. 
 119. Furst, supra note 5; Jennifer Bjorhus, If You’re Poor, You’ll Pay More for Car 
Insurance, Study Finds, STAR TRIB. (June 27, 2016), http://www.startribune.com/re
port-low-income-drivers-pay-59-percent-more-for-car-insurance/384565011/. 
 120. Furst, supra note 5. 
 121. License Reinstatement Diversion Pilot Program, 2009 Minn. Laws, ch. 59 
art. 3 § 4. 
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program.122 This directly contradicts the express language of the 
Minnesota law that created the program.123 Without oversight, 
Diversion Solutions is incentivized to keep participants in the 
program so they can collect the entirety of each individual’s $350 
program fee, and additionally inflate their purported success. 
iii. Misrepresenting DDP’s success 
DDP is required by law to release a biannual report 
“concerning the results of the program” including “recidivism rates 
for participants . . . and the number of participants who have 
terminated from the pilot program.”124 If Diversion Solutions is 
violating the statute by keeping participants in the program who 
should have been terminated because of subsequent moving 
violations, data for recidivism rates and termination rates may not 
be accurate.125 
Additionally, Diversion Solutions claims DDP has an 82% 
success rate, counting participants who are “graduated, active or 
waiting.”126 Data from the Department of Public Safety reveals that 
“only 223 of the 27,308 drivers who applied to the program 
successfully completed it—a rate of less than 1 percent.”127 This 
suggests that most drivers “end up in an endless cycle of making 
payments to the company without getting their full driving 
privileges back.”128 
The number of drivers who became valid through DDP has 
also been called into question. The company touts on its website 
that “[s]ince 2009, the program has had over 12,000 participants 
 
 122. Interview with Scott Adkisson, supra note 83. 
 123. License Reinstatement Diversion Pilot Program, 2009 Minn. Laws, ch. 59 
art. 3 § 4; Furst, supra note 5 (“A 2016 DPS review of the program found Diversion 
Solutions continued to accept payments from participants even though subsequent 
tickets disqualified them from the program.”). 
 124. License Reinstatement Diversion Pilot Program, 2009 Minn. Laws, ch. 59 
art. 3 § 4. 
 125. Furst, supra note 5 (“Diversion Solutions said just 6 percent of those in the 
program reoffend, but ‘DVS records indicate a much higher recidivism rate,’ 
according to a memo by Liam Powell, who supervises the driver’s license 
reinstatement program in DPS’ Driver and Vehicle Services division.”). 
 126. Furst, supra note 5. 
 127. Furst, supra note 5; 2017 Legislative Report, supra note 7, at 9 (reporting 
that from 2009 through 2016 over 23,494 individuals applied for DDP and 13,374 
were accepted to participate and l0,120 were rejected). 
 128. Furst, supra note 5 
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legally reinstated.”129 Department of Public Safety data, however, 
indicates only 4,589 drivers have become valid through the 
program.130 A full audit of the program is required to determine 
DDP’s actual success. 
iv. Failing to provide an adequate educational component 
The 2017 Legislative Report states that DDP participants are 
required “to attend a 4 hour educational course” on the program’s 
requirements in addition to educational lessons on “[w]hy there are 
laws, 36 laws that they must absolutely know and how to become a 
responsible neighbor.”131 The actual class is at most an hour and a 
half, and most of that time is spent going over the participants’ 
contracts.132 The only educational aspect of the class consisted of a 
brief eight-minute video on basic driver education.133 Diversion 
Solutions is not incentivized to make sure drivers are equipped with 
the requisite knowledge of highway safety. Classes therefore focus 
on what they are incentivized to make sure participants 
understand: payment. 
C. DDP’s Merits 
While in many ways DDP fails to meet the goals of well-
intended policy-makers, prosecutors, and criminal justice 
advocates, it could be argued that it is worth keeping, despite its 
flaws. Drivers in DDP get the opportunity to avoid convictions, 
settle criminal justice debts, and drive confidently with valid 
licenses. DDP, as a form of pay-only diversion, does not wield the 
threat of jail to coerce payment, which has been reported in abusive 
pay-only probation programs.134 Not only does DDP cost taxpayers 
nothing, but the program helps the state “recover[] significant 
outstanding fine and fee revenue that would otherwise remain 
uncollected.”135 Additionally, there are unintended benefits of DDP 
 
 129. Diversion Solutions, Driver’s License Reinstatement Program: For 
Participant, https://diversionsolutions.net/participants/drivers-license-reinstatemen
t-program/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2019). 
 130. Furst, supra note 5. 
 131. 2017 Legislative Report, supra note 7, at 7. 
 132. Scott Adkisson, CEO, Diversion Solutions, LLC, Address at the Driving 
Diversion Program Class (Jan. 4, 2018). 
 133. Id. 
 134. ALBIN-LACKEY, supra note 3, at 25–27. 
 135. 2017 Legislative Report, supra note 7, at 11. 
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including “[p]aid citations in non-participating jurisdictions; 
[v]oluntary clearance of active arrest warrants; [d]isposition of 
dormant DAS/DAR citations; Department of Revenue collection 
fees; [s]atisfaction of outstanding judgments; and [p]ayment of child 
support arrears.”136 DDP has not been without success stories.137 
DDP supporters may argue that the private pay-only diversion 
model is significantly better than alternative solutions: no program 
at all or a state-run program. Without any program in place, 
unlicensed drivers will continue to accumulate DAS/DAR charges 
and struggle to pay the accruing fines and fees without the ability 
to drive. A state-run program may not be as effective at collecting 
criminal justice debt as private companies. Additionally, the cost of 
a state-run program will likely be harder to justify to taxpayers 
than a zero-tax-dollar private program. However, the merits of the 
private pay-only diversion model are marred by Diversion 
Solutions’ rampant abuses, and its ineffectiveness for many of 
Minnesota’s lowest income drivers. With payment as the sole 
substantive requirement of diversion and nonpayment resulting in 
prosecution, diversion and its promises are a privilege out of reach 
for the poor.138 
D. Recommendations 
One of the Legislature’s intentions in creating DDP was to 
collect criminal justice debt through the most cost-effective method: 
privatization.139 The recent reports of abuse—most notably that 
Diversion Solutions accepts payments before confirming that the 
driver is insured—illustrate that privatizing the license 
reinstatement program with no regulatory oversight or 
accountability leaves participants vulnerable to greedy collection 
tactics. Many of the stated goals of DDP are steeped in benevolence, 
such as providing a solution for drivers who cannot afford to pay 
 
 136. 2017 Legislative Report, supra note 7, at 10. 
 137. See Salisbury, supra note 9. 
 138. See Dewan & Lehren, supra note 41 (reporting on how diversion “can be 
revoked for failure to pay, or never even offered to defendants deemed too poor to 
afford it” leading to dramatic inequalities). 
 139. 2017 Legislative Report, supra note 7, at 6, 10. See also Pub. Safety & Sec. 
Policy & Fin. Comm., 2017 Leg., 90th Sess. (Minn. 2017) (statement by Rep. Zerwas) 
(“You can’t lose out on what we are not collecting and that is what we are facing right 
now . . . we’ve brought in $6.6 million since 2010 . . . that is $1.3 million a year in 
fines and fees that otherwise would not be collected if there wasn’t a payment plan 
allowing these people to get to work.”). 
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fines and fees and ensuring public safety.140 However, as long as 
third-party administrators are allowed to operate with no oversight 
or accountability, the criminal justice debt-collection function of the 
program will trump any of the more altruistic intentions of the 
program. 
In order to balance the interests of providing a cost-effective 
solution that does not put profits above quality performance, the 
Minnesota Legislature must enact several accountability measures 
before expanding DDP statewide. The current statute authorizing 
the pilot program not only enables the aforementioned abuses, but 
also leaves the door open to further corruption. If Minnesota hopes 
to create a functioning DDP, it has two options. It could put 
protections in place to keep third-party administrators like 
Diversion Solutions accountable. Else, it must fundamentally 
change and become a program within the Department of Public 
Safety. The very need for the program may be dramatically reduced 
and some of its goals achieved by eliminating social non-
conformance suspensions and reducing fines and fees. 
i. Necessary accountability and oversight measures for a 
statewide DDP 
The legislation that authorized the creation of DDP as a pilot 
program provides few requirements for third-party administrators. 
If the Minnesota Legislature wants to expand the program 
statewide,141 the statute must have specific requirements for third-
party administrators that ensure program fee structures and 
payment plans are fair and not overly burdensome for participants. 
However, as seen with Diversion Solutions’ failure to meet the 
statutorily required educational components without consequences, 
compliance with statutory requirements must be ensured with 
proper oversight and accountability measures. 
 
 140. Pub. Safety & Sec. Policy & Fin. Comm., 2017 Leg., 90th Sess. (Minn. 2017) 
(statement by Mary Ellen Heng, Minneapolis Deputy City Att’y, Crim. Div.) (“We 
want people to be driving legally with valid insurance in the event that they should 
have an accident . . . .We want programs to hold people accountable while also being 
fair to their circumstances.”); Salisbury, supra note 9 (“Poor people are 
disproportionately affected by driver’s license suspensions, [Rep. Zerwas] said. ‘We’re 
criminalizing poverty.’”). 
 141. Legislation seeking to make DDP a statewide program was introduced in the 
2017 session. Though the bill failed to be made into law, it had bipartisan support 
and could potentially be reintroduced in upcoming sessions. License Reinstatement 
Diversion Program, H.F. 1671, 90th Leg. § 171.2405 (2017). 
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Human Rights Watch has made recommendations to states 
that contract with for-profit probation companies.142 Many of these 
recommendations are appropriate for DDP. If the Minnesota 
legislature seeks to make DDP a statewide program and continue 
to contract with private diversion companies to run it, the 
legislature should enact accountability provisions that include the 
creation of an oversight committee sufficiently staffed with 
professionals capable of conducting thorough investigations, 
unannounced inspections, and compliance reviews.143 This 
oversight committee would be responsible for collecting and 
publishing data on how much money third-party administrators 
collect in fees from DDP participants; how many participants are 
terminated from DDP and for what cause; and, how many 
participants and former participants re-offend and/or become re-
suspended. 
Ideally, the legislature would move away from an offender-
funded model and prohibit third-party administrators from 
collecting program fees.144 Program fees discriminate against low-
income offenders by making diversion accessible only to those who 
can afford to pay for the benefit of avoiding prosecution. 
Additionally, program fees incentivize private diversion companies 
to enroll ineligible participants.145 However, simply replacing 
program fees with a fixed price contract may produce a low-bid race 
to the bottom with companies employing reductionist methods to 
offer the least expensive program.146 The only way to remove 
program fees and ensure quality service to participants would be to 
run the program internally in the Department of Public Safety with 
professionally trained staff who are not incentivized by profits but 
by making Minnesota’s roadways safer. 
ii. Remove the causes 
Legislators should take aim at the root causes that cause 
individuals to fail to pay fines and fees, lose their licenses for failing 
 
 142. ALBIN-LACKEY, supra note 3, at 7. 
 143. See ALBIN-LACKEY, supra note 3, at 7. 
 144. See ALBIN-LACKEY, supra note 3, at 7. 
 145. See Furst, supra note 5. 
 146. E.g. Margaret Lemos, Civil Challenges to the Use of Low-Bid Contracts for 
Indigent Defense, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1808 (2000) (describing the challenges of 
ensuring quality when counties employ low-bid contract systems for indigent 
defense). 
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to pay, and accumulate low-level criminal charges and criminal 
justice debt. 
Legislators should remove mandated suspension of driving 
privileges for individuals who commit non-highway safety 
violations.147 These social non-conformance suspensions waste the 
time and resources of police officers, courts, prosecutors, and motor 
vehicle agencies and do not serve a public safety purpose. Police 
officers’ time spent issuing citations to suspended drivers “takes 
valuable time and resources away from other traffic and public 
safety efforts.”148 Besides burdening courts and prosecutors with a 
surplus of low-level, non-violent offenses, the additional DAS and 
DAR cases that result from non-driving related reasons require 
motor vehicle agencies to “operate outside of their core mission of 
ensuring highway safety.”149 
Using license suspensions as a means of forcing criminal 
justice debt payment is especially counterproductive. When 
Minnesota Representative Zerwas, chief sponsor of a 2017 bill that 
sought to expand DDP statewide, was asked by Representative 
Hilstrom whether they should consider not suspending licenses for 
failure to pay, he responded, “without that penalty, you wouldn’t get 
compliance.”150 However, with 75% of suspended drivers continuing 
to drive, license suspensions are clearly an ineffective method of 
compliance.151 Indeed, the practice defies logic, because “you’re not 
going to increase the likelihood that they can pay it by taking away 
their driver’s license.”152 
As discussed in Part I.D, license suspensions 
disproportionately affect poor communities and communities of 
 
 147. This possible solution is already gaining interest. Jessie Van Berkel, License 
Suspensions a “Catch-22” Some Lawmakers Aim to Fix, STAR TRIB. (Apr. 5, 2018), h
ttp://www.startribune.com/license-suspensions-a-catch-22-some-lawmakers-aim-to-
fix/478913373/?om_rid=2492076489&om_mid=78329289 (“A measure now under 
consideration [by the Minnesota legislature] would prohibit the punishment of 
suspending someone’s driver’s license because they did not pay a traffic or parking 
ticket.”). 
 148. AAMVA, supra note 49, at 13. 
 149. AAMVA, supra note 49, at 22. 
 150. Pub. Safety & Sec. Policy & Fin. Comm., 2017 Leg., 90th Sess. (Minn. 2017) 
(statement by Rep. Zerwas). 
 151. AAMVA, supra note 49, at 4. 
 152. Tell Me More: Reconsidering Driver’s License Suspensions as Punishment, 
NPR (Mar. 10, 2014), https://www.npr.org/2014/03/10/288587071/reconsidering-driv
ers-license-suspensions-as-punishment (quoting Mike Riggs). 
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color.153 DDP attempts to provide a solution that helps low-income 
suspended drivers, but DDP, as an offender-funded program 
operated by a private company with little oversight, often ends up 
contributing to the burdens facing participants by making them pay 
more and entangling them in the criminal justice system for much 
longer. Payment plans have the potential to help low-income drivers 
pay off fines and fees, but such plans should be made available 
before suspension is a threat. If a driver gets a speeding ticket and 
needs the time or the opportunity to pay it off in installments, the 
court—not a private company—should accommodate that need. 
This is possible without charging more through supervision fees, 
program fees, and interest, or by threatening suspension, late fees, 
or jail, or implementing other government-imposed penalties154 for 
failure to make payments. Minnesota should move away from an 
offender-funded, revenue-generating criminal justice system. 
Legislators should reduce fines and eliminate mandatory 
surcharges.155 Additionally, offenders should have options to satisfy 
fines online and convert fines to community service. 
Conclusion 
Minnesota’s Driving Diversion Program attempts to help low-
income suspended drivers get valid licenses, pay off their criminal 
justice system debt, and avoid prosecution for driving after 
suspension. Several trends in criminal justice contributed to the 
creation of DDP including the decriminalization of misdemeanors, 
the shift to an offender-funded system, the use of pay-only probation 
and diversion outsourced to for-profit companies, and non-driving 
related license suspensions. 
While not without merit, DDP has not fulfilled the vision of its 
creators and supporters. Diversion Solutions, the for-profit 
company that administers DDP, has violated the program’s 
 
 153. Aiken, supra note 56. 
 154. Nonpayment of traffic fines would not be immune to any indirect 
consequences, such as affecting credit scores. Stacey Tisdale, Real Money Matters: 
Unpaid Parking Tickets Can Lead to Lower Credit Score, ALJAZEERA AM. (Oct. 17, 
2017), http://america.aljazeera.com/watch/shows/real-money-with-alivelshi/Real-Mo
ney-Blog/2013/10/17/credit-trivia.html. 
 155. MINN. STAT. § 357.021, subd. 6(a) (2018) (“[T]he court shall impose and the 
court administrator shall collect a $75 surcharge on every person convicted of any 
felony, gross misdemeanor, misdemeanor, or petty misdemeanor offense, other than 
a violation of a law or ordinance relating to vehicle parking, for which there shall be 
a $12 surcharge.”). 
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enabling legislation by accepting payments prior to a participant’s 
proof of insurance, keeping participants enrolled despite 
disqualifying moving violations, misrepresenting DDP’s success, 
and failing to provide an adequate educational component. These 
abuses illustrate that for-profit, pay-only diversion is a flawed 
model that puts cost-cutting and profits above quality performance. 
The public goal behind DDP—reducing the number of unlicensed 
drivers on the road—does not fit with how the third-party, for-profit 
company is incentivized, therefore leading to poor quality of service, 
unmet promises, and abusive practices. 
The Minnesota Legislature should enact accountability 
measures that will help reduce DDP’s third-party administrator 
abuses such as an effective oversight committee and ideally the 
removal of program fees. The Legislature also should consider 
addressing the reasons that create and perpetuate the need for 
DDP— the burden of criminal justice debt heaped upon unlicensed 
drivers who cannot afford to stop driving. Policy changes that meet 
this goal include limiting suspensions as a possible sanction for only 
bad driving conduct and moving away from an offender-funded 
system by reducing fines, making fines easier to pay, and 
eliminating mandatory surcharges. 
